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Introduction 
- In South Dakota, Republican Senator James Abdnor's television ads wooed the state's beef and pork producers 
by accusing his rival of accepting advice on farm problems from red meat critic Jane Fonda. 1 
- In New York, Democrat Mark Green's ads questioned his Italian-American opponent's campaign contributions 
from alleged organized crime figures . 2 
- In Maryland, Republican Linda Chavez branded unmarried foe Barbara Mikulski a "San Francisco-type liberal" 
with an ~nti-male Marxist feminist on her staff. 3 
- In Pennsylvania, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Bob Casey accused his opponent, Lt. Governor William 
Scranton, III, the son of the popular former governor, of absenteeism from the state senate . "They gave him his job 
because of his fa ther's name," one television ad suggests. 'The least he could do would be to show up for work ."4 
As the mud began to mount, the pundits spoke out, labeling "1986 as the year of the nega tive campaign,''s and 
the 'low-water mark" in negative political advertising. 6 Explanations for the rise in negative adver tising were 
almost as plentiful as the examples of it. Leonard Matthews, president of the American Association of Advertising 
Agencies, suggested that in political advertising, as in all advertising, "it's harder to say something positive about 
yourself or your product than it is to attack the other guy. " 7 Republican consultant Roger Stone admitted that 
"voters don't like negative ads, but they retain the information so much better than the positive ones."8 Former 
Democratic political consultant Charles Guggenheim speculated that "the nature of the 30 and 60-s~cond spot 
encourages negative advertising because it's much easier to hit and run anq to use innilendo . "9 But Barry Goldwatt;r 
blamed the consultants, who "just sit down and think up dirty things." 10 However, the most widely accepted 
explanation was simply that "negative commercials work."11 
Reactions to the blight of negative ads were varied and not always rational. While continuing to run his own 
negative ads, Colorado Republican gubernatorial nominee Ted Strickland proclaimed that "if elected he would 
consider signing legislation preventing people who use negative ads from serving in office." 1 2 Revolted by the 
negative advertising in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial race, William Scranton, III declared a "unilateral truce" and 
withdrew his own negative ads. 13 After the November election, several groups-including a ten member bipartisan 
commission in Wisconsin, members of Congress, and advertisers-discussed ways to control negative advertising 
in future elections. 14 Finally, one candidate for county sheriff beat his opponents to the punch by launching his 
campaign with a newspaper ad "that boldly proclaimed he hadn't been inside a church for years, once drank 
heavily and curses 'like a sailor' . "1 5 
During the 1986 Tennessee gubernatorial race, negative campaigning was, at first, limited. But in mid-October, 
Republican gubernatorial candidate Winfield Dunn began airing a "man on the street' television ad that questioned 
opponent Ned McWherter's interests in "the state-regulated industries of trucking, banking, nursing homes, and 
beer distribution. "16 McWherter responded by accusing Dunn of "running a negative campaign" and "polluting the 
airwaves ." 17 Later, McWherter's television ads attacked Dunn's record as governor and his avoidanc~ of income 
tax payments in 1982 and 1983. 18 In the last week of the campaign, McWherter kept airing his negative ads, but 
Dunn switched to television ads featuring a strong endorsement from Governor Lamar Alexander. 19 After Dunn's 
defeat , Tennessee Republican Chaiqnan Jim Henry saw McWherter's attacks on D1.mn's tax records as especially 
damaging, lamenting "I can assure you that no on~ in this state can miss two years paying taxes and win an 
election. "20 
Previous Research 
Studies of negative campaigning have focused on the acceptance of negative adv~rtising by the electorate, the 
demographic variables related to its acceptability, and the impact of negative advertising on both the target and the 
sponsor of the attack . In an early study of public perceptions of mud-slinging and mud-slingers, Stewart measured 
attitudes toward twenty hypothetical campaign statements .. n He found that "all statements that seemed to attack a 
political opponent - even ones referring to broken promises and voting records- were cited as mud-slinging by the 
majority or a large minority of respondents," and mud-slingers were perceived "to be untrustworthy, dishonest, 
incompetent , unqualified , urylikeable, not self-confident, and immat~re. "22 · 
Surlin and Gordon found ·that different types of eligible voters respond differently to negative political ads. 23 In 
particular, low socio-economic status (SES) respondents believed that these ads are both more informative and 
more unethical than middle SES respondents . In addition, Black respondents found negative ads to be both more 
informa tive and more "affective" (the ads both entertained and made the respondent more favorable toward the 
sponsoring candidate) than White respondents. 
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In ~ study of the recall of specific television ads, Garramone found that the more frequently 4 negative ad was 
perceived to be true, the more effective it was. 24 However, in general, negative advertising delivered a backlash, 
producing "a strong negative influence on the viewer's feelings toward the sponsor but only a slight net negative 
influence on feelings toward the target."25 In a subsequent experimental study, Garramone found that negative 
advertising was more effective if it was sponsored by a source other than the candidate (e.g., political action 
committees). 26 In addition, Garramone found that rebuttals by the target candidate increased the backlash against 
the original attacker, but did not change respondents' percep~ions of the target. In summary, although most eligible 
voters are critical of negative political advertising, it can negatively effect perceptions of the attacked candidate 
when its claims are widely believed. However, attacking candidates runs a substantial risk of backlash, vyhkh may 
be more detrimental to the attacker's image than the original attack was to their opponents'. 
Although previous research has identified and qualified some of the effects of negative advertising, it has not 
specified the limitations the public places on negative advertising. Specifically, previous research has not identified 
what characteristics of a candidate are believed by eligible voters to be "fair game" for attack by the candidate's 
opponent in a political ad and what charac;:teristics should be "off limits." In addition, previous research provides 
an incomplete picture of how demographic variables (sex, age, race, income, edl,lcation) and political beliefs 
(partisanship, ideology) are related to toleranc~ for negative political advertising. 
This study addressed these concerns by exploring the limits on negative politic;:al advertising expressed by eligible 
voters during the 1986 Tennessee gubernatorial race. The study addressed two questions: 
1. What candidate characteristics do eligible voters believe can be fairly attacked in an opponent's political 
advertising, and what characteristics shet-lld not be attacked? 
2. How do eligible voters with a high toleran~e for negative advertising differ from voters with a low tolerance? 
Method 
Respondents and Procedure 
The respondents were 336 eligible voters from Memphis, Tennessee. Respondents' households were randomly 
selected from residential listings in the most recent Memphis telephone directory using a procedure outlined by 
Frey. 27 To lower the refusal rate, an introductory letter was mailed to each household, before telephone contact 
explaining the nature of the study. Four attempts were made to contact each randomly selected household before 
that household was dropped frqm the sample. Once the household was contacted, one elig~ble voter per household 
was randomly selected for interview, using procedures described by Backstrom and Hursh;~8 The refusal rate for 
those households contacted was 28%. The sample was 61% female and 64% White, with an average age of 45 
years and an average of 13 years of education. Tne median household income was between $19,000 and $30,000. 
Trained graduate students conducted the interviews. Most interviews were conducted on Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Thursday .pights between 6;30 and 9:30 PM, during the weeks of October 12 and October 19, 
1986. 
Negative Advertising Item 
The negative advertising attitude measures were peveloped by using the results of a pilot study of 55 Little Rock, 
Arkansas .residents conducted jn August 1986. Respondents answered two open ended questions: 
1. What elements in a candidate's record or personal life are fair game for attack in an opponent's political ads? 
2. Is there anything in a candidate's record or personal life that should not be attacked in an opponent's political 
ads? 
These open ended questions generated 34 items considered fair to attack in political ads and 26 items considered 
unfair. These 60 items were reduced to the 10 most frequently mentioned items: four "fair" and six "unfair" items. 
The fair items were a candidate's political records, stands on the issues, voting records, and criminal activities. The 
unfair items were a candidate's personal life, current or past marriage, family members, religion, medical history, 
and sex life. 
In the main study, respondents were asked if they believed it was fair or unfair for an opponent to attack each of 
these ten items in a political ~d. For each item, an answer of unfair was scored as zero and an answer of fair was 
scored as one. Negative Advertising Tolerance (NAT) equalled the sum of the respondent's answers to the ten 
individual items. Thus, the possible NAT scores ranged from zero to ten. 
Demographic and Political Belief Variables 
Partisanship was measured on a seven point scale where one represented strong Democrat and seven strong 
Republican. Ideology was also measured on ~ seven point s(:a}e where one represent~d strong conservative and 
seven strong liberal. At the close of ~he telephone int~rview, respondents wer~ a~ke<;l their sex, age, ra(:e, education 
and household income levels. . 
Results 
Table 1 contains the percentages of respondents who found each of the ten negative advertising items either fair 
or unfair. 
Table 1 
Fairness or Unfairness of Items Attacked 
ITEM 
Unfair Items 
Sex Life 
Marriage 
Religion 
Personal Life 
Family Members 
Medical History 
Fair Items 
Voting Record 
Political Record 
Criminal Activities 
Stands on the Issues 
UNFAIR FAIR 
TOATTACK TOATTACK 
81.3% 14.9 
79.5% 18.8% 
75 .3% 23.5% 
74.7% 23.8% 
73 .5% 24.1% 
61.3% 36.9% 
20.2% 77.7% 
17.9% 79.5% 
14.0% 84.2% 
8.6% 89.0% 
NO 
RESPONSE 
3.9 
1.8% 
1.2% 
1.5% 
2.4% 
1.8% 
2.1% 
2.7% 
1.8% 
2.4 
Five of the six items viewed as unfair to attack in the pilot study were also deemed unfair by respondents in the 
main study. Less than 25% of the respondents believed that it was fair for candidates to attack their opponents' sex 
lives, current or previous marriages, personal lives, religious preferences, or family members. There was slightly 
more tolerance of attacks on an opponent's medical history. The four "fair" items suggested by respondents in the 
pilot study were also viewed by respondents in the main study as fair areas for attack, especially the candidates' 
stands on the issues and criminal activities. 
The respondents had an average Negative Advertising Tolerance of 4.79 on a ten .point scale. Twenty-four 
percent of the respondents had low NAT's (scores ranging from zero to three), 57% had average NAT's (scores 
ranging from four to six), and.19% had high NAT's (scores ranging from seven to ten). The relationships between 
NAT and five demographic variables (sex,. race, education, household income, age) and two political belief 
variables (partisanship and ideology) are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Relationships between Negative Advertising Tolerance (NAT) and Demographic/Political Beliefs.Variable 
% WITH % WITH % WITH 
VARIABLES LOWNAT AVERAGENAT HIGHNAT 
SEX* · 
Males · 16.7 59.6 23.77 
Females 28.5 55.4 16.11 
RACE* 
W hites · 20.8 55 .7 23 .44 
Blacks 29.5 59.0 11.44 
EDUCATION* 
No H.S. Degree 40.4 40.4 19.1 
H.S. Degree 27.2 53.3 19.66 
Some College 23.4 63.6 13.00 
College Degree 12.0 63.9 24.1 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Under $19,000 32.4 52.9 14.77 
$19-30,000 20.3 58 .0 21.77 
O ver $30,000 17.3 60.9 21.8 
AGE 
18-30 22.9 65 .1 12.0 
31-40 17.9 59.7 22.4 
41-60 22.0 54.9 23.2 
Over 60 31.7 47.6 20.6 
PARTISANS HIP* 
Republicans 21.7 46.7 31.7 
Independents 21.6 62.1 16.4 
Democrats 28.1 57.0 14.9 
IDEOLOGY* 
Conservatives 26.4 40.3 33.3 
Moderates 22 .8 62.9 14.4 
Liberals 22.4 63 .8 13.8 
*Indicates signiticant chi-square (p .OS) with NAT 
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Chi-square analy~es between each of these variables and NAT produ,ed five statistically ftignifkant (p ~ .05) 
relationships: sex (chi-square 6.47, Cramer's V .147,N 300, race (chi-square 7.38, Craq1er's V .158, N ?-97, 
education (chi-square 16.97, Cramer's V .168, N 299, partisanship (chi-square 9.35, (r~mer's V .127, N ~90~ 
and ideology (chi-square 15.84, Cramer's V .163, N 297. Household income and age were not signific~ntly related 
to NAT. 
An analysis of cross tabul~tions and significant chi-squares reported in Table 2 reveals some clear patterns. 
Females were more likely to have low NAT's than males and males were more likely to have high NAT's. Blacks 
were more likely to have low NAT's than Whites and Whites were twice as likely to have high NAT's. Rt$pondents 
without a high school degree were twice as likely to have low NAT's as they were to have high NAT's. For college 
graduates, the rev~rse was truf, Democrats were som~what more likely than Republi<;ans to have low NAT's, but 
Republicans were over twice as likely to have high NAT's. Finally, conservatives wen~ almost two and a half tiq1es 
as likely as liberals to have high NAT's. To summarize, high NAT respondents were more likely to be m~le, ,allege 
educated, White, conservative, and Republican. Low NAT respondents were more likely to be female, without a 
high school degree, Black, and Democratic. 
Conclusions 
Previous research has identified some of the effects negative political advertisin~ has on both the target ~nd the 
sponsor of that advertising. This study has attempted to clarify attitudes regarding the boundaries of negatiye 
political advertising during a particular political contest. Specifically, respondents evaluated the fairness of ten 
candidate 'haracteristics that might be attacked in a political ad. Then, the responses to the~~ items wer~ summed 
to produce the respondents' Negative Advertising Tolerances (NAT). The relationships between NAT and ~ven 
demographic and political belief variables were then evaluated to determine which groups have hi~h toleraiu;e.for 
negative political adverti~ing and which groups have low tolerance. 
In general, respondents beli~ved that negative political advertising that addresses the tilrget candiqate's political 
record, including his/her voting record and stands on the issues of the campaign, is fair. The possible 'riminal 
activities of the target candidate are also fair game. However, attacks related to the candidate's personalliff are 
usually considered unfair. These include attacks on the candidate's sex life, marriage, religion, and farp.ily 
members. A majority of respondents also believed that the candidate's medical history should not be attacked, 
although the percentage was substantiallY lower than for other personal matters. 
Negative Advertising Tolerance was signif~cantly r~lated to sex, ra,e, education, partisanship, and ideology; but 
not related to age or household income. Males, Whites, college graduates, Republicans, and ,onservatives are more 
likely to be high in NAT; females, Black, high school dropo4ts, and Democrats are more likely to be low in NAT. 
Although potentially useful to politicians considering a negative advertising campaign, the results of this study 
should be interpreted cautiously. The res4lts represent the opinions of respondents from a particular location 
during a specific ele~tion abollt the fairness of attacking a candidate in general areas such as personal life, voting 
record, etc. At best, they represent a baseline of opinion from which eligible vot~rs judge concrete political 
advertisements within the context of an ongoing political campaign. The complex rhetorical situation that exists in 
even a simple campaign demands the careful interpret~tion of these results. In general, males may be more tolerant 
than females of nega~ive advertising, but convincing evi~ence of spouse abu~e a week before an ~lection migh~ 
perstJade many undecided wpmen voters. In the ;;lbstract, voters may believe that it is not f~ir l~ att~~k a 
candidate's sex life in a political ad, but that does not mean that it will not be a major fac;tor in~ camp~ign. h1st ask 
Gary Hart. 29 
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